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BOBB V. MUNICIPAL COURT: A 
CHALLENGE TO SEXISM IN 
JURY SELECTION AND VOIR 
DIRE 
In Bobb v. Municipal Court, l a divided First District Court 
of Appeal held a female prospective juror was not in contempt of 
court when, in good faith and a respectful manner, she refused 
to answer voir dire questions the trial judge posed only to the 
female venire members.2 One panel member, Justice Miller, re-
lied on the equal protection provisions of the California Consti-
tution as the basis for the decision. S The second member of the 
majority, without ever reaching a constitutional issue, concluded 
that Ms. Bobb's conduct did not constitute contempt.· The dis-
senting justice would have upheld the contempt judgment. ~ 
This Note discusses how sexism in the jury selection6 and 
voir dire processes' can operate to produce a voir dire which vio-
1. 143 Cal. App. 3d 860. 192 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1983). hearing denied (Aug. 11. 1983). 
2. Id. at 867. 192 Cal. Rptr. at 274. 
3. Id. at 864-67. 192 Cal. Rptr. at 271-74. 
4. Id. at 875. 192 Cal. Rptr. at 279. 
5. Id. at 877. 192 Cal. Rptr. at 281. 
6. For the purposes of this article. jury selection will refer to the selection of pro-
spective jurors from the community. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 203-214 (West 1982) 
which set out the procedures for the selection of prospective jurors in California. In a 
broader sense. jury selection refers to the entire process of selecting which persons will 
sit as jurors in a particular trial. See B. WITKIN. CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 394 
(1963). 
7. Voir dire is the process of questioning prospective jurors to determine whether 
they meet the requisite statutory qualifications and whether they possess prejudices 
which might result in an unfair trial. See B. WITKIN. CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 
406-415 (1963 and Supp. 1983 part I). After questioning the jurors. the attorneys for 
each side may challenge prospective jurors they feel might be biased against their client. 
Challenges are of two types: for cause and peremptory. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1067 (West 
1970). Challenge for cause may be either general or particular. If general. the juror is 
legally incompetent to serve. If particular. the juror is actually or implicitly biased in the 
particular case before the court. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1062-1071 (West 1970). Implied 
bias refers to one of several statutorily defined juror relationships to a party in the case. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1074 (West Supp. 1984). Actual bias refers to the "existence of a 
state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case. or to either of the parties. 
which will prevent [him/herJ from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice 
to the substantial rights of either party .... " CAL. PENAL CODE § 1073 (West 1970). 
A peremptory challenge is an "objection to a juror for which no reason need be 
given. but upon which the court must exclude [him/herJ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 
1970). In People v. Wheeler. the California Supreme Court said that "the law recognizes 
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lates of a prospective juror's guarantee of equal protection. It 
then outlines California's use of strict scrutiny to analyze gen-
der-based classifications. Third, the Note reviews and evaluates 
the three Bobb opinions. Finally, the significance of Justice 
Miller's opinion is discussed. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. SEXISM IN THE JURY SELECTION AND VOIR DIRE PROCESSES 
1. Gender-Based Discrimination in Jury Selection 
Until 1975, a state could constitutionally restrict jury ser-
vice to males.8 In 1898, Utah became the first state to grant 
women an affirmative statutory right to jury service.s The 1957 
Civil Rights Act gave women the right to serve on all federal 
juries. lo State courts, however, continued to restrict the right of 
women to serve on juries.11 
As recently as 1961, the United States Supreme Court held 
In Hoyt v. Florida that a state statute which did not require 
that a peremptory challenge may be predicated on a broad spectrum of evidence sugges-
tive of juror partiality." 22 Cal. 3d 258, 275, 583 P.2d 748, 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 902 
(1976). A record of prior arrests is an example of this kind of bias. Id. 
8. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). Strauder involved a West Virginia 
statutI;) which denied blacks the right to sit on juries. The Supreme Court held that the 
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. In doing so, 
the Court stated that states "may confine selection to males .... " Id. at 310. In 1975, 
the Court overturned Strauder and held that women cannot be excluded from jury ser-
vice solely on the basis of gender. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
9. See Mahoney, Sexism in Voir Dire: The Use of Sex Stereotypes in Jury Selec-
tion, in WOMEN IN THE COURTS 114, 129 n.3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mahoney]. See 
UTAH COOE ANN. §§ 78-46-3 and 78-46-4 (1977) (repealed and reenacted at 78-46-4, 
1979). The statute refers to a jury as "a body of persons . ... " Id. (emphasis added). 
10. 28 U.S.C. § .1861 (1974). "Any citizen of the United States who has attained the 
age of twenty-one years and who has resided for a period of one year within the judicial 
district, is competent to serve as a grand or petit juror .... " (amended 1968). Prior to 
the 1957 amendment, qualifications for federal jurors were the same as those for jurors of 
the highest court of the state in which the federal court was located. 28 U.S.C. § 411 
(1940). 
11. California, for example, did not provide women a statutory right to jury service 
until 1980. ("No person shall be excluded from jury service in the state of California on 
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.") CAL. CIV. PROC. 
COOE § 197.1 (West 1982). 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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women to serve on juries unless they took affirmative steps to be 
placed on the jury list did not violate a female defendant's four-
teenth amendment guarantee of equal protection. 12 The Court 
observed that "[d]espite the enlightened emancipation of women 
from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their 
entry into many parts of community life formerly considered to 
be reserved for men, woman is still regarded as the center of 
home and family life."13 Requiring women to serve on juries 
would therefore interfere with their "distinctive role in soci-
ety."H This reasoning provided the rational grounds necessary 
to justify the statute. Iii 
Women's exemption from juries was not successfully chal-
lenged until 1975 when the United States Supreme Court held 
in Taylor v. Louisianal6 that women may not be excluded from 
jury service based on gender alone.17 The Court reasoned that 
such an exclusion resulted in juries which failed to satisfy a 
criminal defendant's sixth amendment guarantee of a trial by a 
jury comprised of a cross-section of the community. IS The Court 
12. 368 U.S. 57, 62. In Hoyt, a woman was charged with the murder of her husband. 
She was convicted of second-degree murder by an all male jury. On appeal she claimed 
that the challenged statute violated her fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal pro-
tection. The challenged statute provided in part that "the name of no female person 
shall be taken for jury service unless said person has registered with the clerk of the 
circuit court her desire to be placed on the jury list." FLA. STAT., § 40.01(1) (1959). 
13. 368 U.S. at 61-62. 
14. [d. at 63. 
15. [d. 
16. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The statute challenged in Taylor provided that "[a) woman 
shall not be selected for jury service unless she has previously filed with the clerk of 
court of the parish in which she resides a written declaration of her desire to be subject 
to jury service." [d. at 523 n.2 (citing LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 402 (West 1966». 
The statute was challenged by a male defendant whom an all-male jury had convicted of 
aggravated kidnapping. At the time of this challenge, three states still had women-ex-
emption statutes. 
17. The same statute challenged in Taylor was the subject of an earlier, unsuccess-
ful challenge in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972). The male defendant in 
Alexander claimed that the statute violated the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment because it resulted in juries not representative of the community. [d. at 626-
27. The Court overturned the defendant's conviction on other grounds and thus did not 
address the statute's constitutionality. [d. at 633. 
18. 419 U.S. at 531. The "cross-section of the community" requirement is an at-
tempt to assure that a criminal defendant is tried by a jury drawn from venires represen-
tative of the community. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 191 (1946) (holding 
that a federal jury panel from which women were systematically excluded was improp-
erly constituted.) The sixth amendment provides in part that "[i)n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
3
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distinguished Hoyt, noting that it addressed itself only to due 
process and equal protection challenges. IS After Taylor, women 
must be included in the community pool of prospective jurors.20 
2. Sexism in the Voir Dire Process 
In People v. Wheeler,21 the California Supreme Court ex-
plained the purpose of allowing parties to challenge prospective 
jurors: 
The law . . . presumes that each party will use 
[his/her] challenges to remove those prospective 
jurors who appear most likely to be biased against 
[him/her] or in favor of [his/her] opponent; by so 
doing, it is hoped, the extremes of potential 
prejudice on both sides will be eliminated, leaving 
a jury as impartial as can be obtained from the 
available venire. The purpose of the challenges 
also dictates their scope: they are to be used to 
remove jurors who are believed to entertain a spe-
cific bias, and no others.22 
An attorney's right to question and challenge prospective jurors 
to assure an impartial jury for his or her client seemingly con-
flicts with the right of prospective female jurors to equal treat-
ment during this process. A closer examination of this problem 
demonstrates that these two important interests need not 
conflict. 
When preparing voir dire questions and challenging pro-
spective jurors, trial attorneys frequently rely on negative ste-
reotypes contained in trial practice handbooks. Use of these ste-
reotypes probably effects discrimination against prospective 
female jurors, which in turn undermines selection of an impar-
tial jury. 
of the state and district wherein the crime [was] committed .... " U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI (emphasis added). 
19. 419 U.S. at 534-35. 
20. See supra note 7. 
21. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). 
22. [d. at 274, 583 P.2d at 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901. 
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One trial practice handbook advises that "[t]he occupation 
of a woman's husband is important, too, for generally she will 
feel and think in the same manner as her husband."23 This same 
handbook does not suggest, however, that attorneys inquire into 
the male juror's spouse's occupation. Presumably, the rationale 
for this distinction is that a man is not likely to be as influenced 
by his wife's occupation as would be a woman by her husband's. 
Yet no empirical data are supplied to support this inference. 
That the question is asked only of female members of the venire 
results in discriminatory treatment of females and an ineffective 
effort at identifying possible prejudice among individual jurors. 
If spousal occupation does in fact affect the impartiality of pro-
spective jurors, obviously the question should be asked of all 
prospective jurors. 
Another trial practice handbook suggests: "where the client 
is a woman . . . avoid other women on the jury as far as possi-
ble."24 The implication of this observation is that women are less 
able than their male counterparts to judge members of their own 
sex in an impartial manner. No data are provided to support 
this assertion. In fact, studies indicate that the opposite is 
true.211 Thus, an attorney who bases his or her challenges on this 
type of unsubstantiated, stereotypic observation might actually 
be jeopardizing his or her client's chance to obtain a trial by an 
impartial jury.26 
Finally, challenging female jurors on the basis of unsubstan-
tiated stereotypes may violate a criminal defendant's sixth 
amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury. In People v. 
Wheeler, the California Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's 
use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on 
the sole ground that they were black violated the defendant's 
23. H. ROTHBLATr, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES IN THE TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES 23 
(1961). 
24. S. SCHWEITZER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TRIAL PRACTICE 162 (1970). 
25. Mahoney, supra note 9, at 125, citing a study performed by Nagel and Weitz-
man, Women as Litigants, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 193 (1971). The researchers found that 
women-dominated juries gave civil awards to women that averaged 17 percent above the 
expected average for that type of injury, and gave men only 3 percent above what would 
be expected. [d. at 194-96. 
26. One commentator has noted an instance where, due in part to her irritation with 
one particular sexist question put forward by a plaintiff's attorney during voir dire, a 
juror initially voted against recovery for the plaintiff. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: 
An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1965). 
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right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the 
community.27 The court reasoned that "when a party presumes 
that certain jurors are biased merely because they are members 
of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic 
or similar grounds-we may call this 'group bias'-and peremp-
torily strikes all such persons for that reason alone, [s/he] ... 
frustrates the primary purpose of the representative cross-sec-
tion requirement."28 Basing juror challenges on sexist stereo-
types might well violate the Wheeler principle. 
The interest of an attorney in securing an impartial jury for 
his or her client and a female member of the venire in securing 
equal treatment need not be mutually exclusive. As Wheeler 
pointed out, the attorney must seek the elimination of specific 
biases-those "[biases] relating to the particular case on trial or 
the parties or witnesses thereto .... [T]he characteristics on 
which they focus cut across many segments of our society."29 
Challenging jurors on this basis-rather than on the basis of ste-
reotypes-would better serve both the interest of equal protec-
tion and securing an impartial jury. 
B. STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW OF GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION 
In Sail'er Inn u. Kirby, the California Supreme Court con-
cluded that gender is a suspect classification.30 The court rea-
soned that gender, like race and alienage, is an immutable trait, 
and generally bears no relation to one's ability to perform or to 
contribute to society.31 In addition, women, like blacks and 
27. 22 Cal. 3d at 277-78, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. 
28. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
202 (1965), petitioner, a black, was convicted of rape and sentenced to death. Of the 
eight blacks in the venire for the trial, two were exempt and six were peremptorily struck 
by the prosecutor. The court held that neither this nor the fact that no black had served 
on an Alabama petit jury in the past fourteen years established a violation of the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 222, 224. 
29. 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. 
30. 5 Cal. 3d I, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, (1981). 
31. Id. at 18, 485 P.2d at 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 339. The California Supreme Court 
analogized women to blacks and aliens by way of the now-famous Frontiero factors. In 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the United States Supreme Court isolated 
the characteristics cited in Sail'er Inn and indicated that these characteristics are useful 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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aliens, have historically been denied significant legal and social 
privileges such as the rights to vote and serve on juries; equal 
employment and educational opportunities; and equal property 
and contractual rights.32 
Suspect classifications are subject to strict scrutiny review.33 
Thus, California courts will uphold a gender-based classification 
only if the government demonstrates that a compelling state in-
terest underlies its action and that the classification is necessary 
to further that interest. 34 
Since Sail'er Inn, California courts have applied strict scru-
tiny to find unconstitutional minimum security jail facilities 
with special privileges provided for male but not female in-
mates;31i to invalidate a statute which established a conclusive 
presumption of total dependency of a surviving wife but no such 
presumption regarding a surviving husband;36 and to hold un-
constitutional the disparate treatment of women inmates m 
transportation to court and the right of contact visits.37 
II. THE BOBB DECISION 
A. FACTS 
c' 
Attorney Carolyn Bobb was a prospective juror in a munici-
pal criminal case. During judge-conducted voir dire, only female 
venire members were questioned as to their marital status and 
spouse's occupation. Ms. Bobb refused to answer these ques-
tions. She explained that if the questions were relevant to 
women, they were relevant to men. She said she would answer 
the questions only if they were also asked of the male prospec-
tive jurors. The judge refused to accept this suggestion and in-
structed Ms. Bobb to answer the questions. She again refused. 
in identifying suspect classes. Id. at 686-87. 
32. 5 Cal. 3d at 19, 485 P.2d at 540-41, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41. 
33. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
34. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973). 
35. Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d I, 154 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1979). 
36. Arp v. Workers Compensation Appeal Board, 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849, 138 
Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977). 
37. Inmates of Sybil Brand Inst. for Women v. County of Los Angeles, 130 Cal. App. 
3d 89, 181 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1982). 
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She was held in contempt and taken into custody.38 Ms. Bobb's 
petition for certiorari was denied by the superior court and the 
contempt judgment was affirmed.39 The First District Court of 
Appeal reversed the contempt judgment. 
B. JUSTICE MILLER'S OPINION 
Justice Miller found that posing the challenged questions 
only to the female members of the venire violated the equal pro-
tection provisions of the California Constitution.40 Conse-
quently, Ms. Bobb was justified in refusing to answer the dis-
criminatory questions and her refusal could not result in a 
contempt judgment.4l 
Justice Miller first noted the similarity of the instant case 
with Hamilton v. Alabama.42 In Hamilton, the United States 
Supreme Court, per curiam, annulled a contempt conviction is-
sued when a black witness refused to answer questions as long as 
she was addressed by her first name.43 In finding Hamilton "di-
rectly on point"," Justice Miller implicitly accepted Ms. Bobb's 
contention that a "court which issues an unconstitutional order 
acts in excess of its jurisdiction and, accordingly, there is no con-
tempt of court on the part of one who refuses to obey such an 
38. Bobb, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 863, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 271. Ms. Bobb spent fifteen 
minutes in a holding cell and then was released on her own recognizance on condition 
she return later that afternoon for sentencing. After she was denied a continuance to find 
an attorney and research her case, Ms. Bobb was sentenced to one day in jail, with credit 
for time served. [d. 
39. [d. 
40. Bobb, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 867, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 274. CAL. CONST. art 1, § 7(a) 
provides that a "person may not be ... denied equal protection of the laws .... " 
41. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 867, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 274. 
42. 376 U.S. 650 (1967). In reversing Ms. Hamilton's contempt citation, the Su-
preme Court cited Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963). In Johnson, the Court re-
versed a contempt conviction of a black who refused to sit in the section of the court-
room reserved for blacks. The Court in Johnson stated that the "[contempt] conviction 
cannot stand, for it is no longer open to question that a State may not constitutionally 
require segregation of public facilities." [d. at 62. 
43. The facts of Hamilton were set out by Justice Douglas in Bell v. Maryland, 378 
U.S. 226, 248-49 n.4 (1964). 
44. Bobb, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 864, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 272. 
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order."411 
Justice Miller next indicated that California regards gender-
based classifications as suspect and therefore subjects them to 
strict scrutiny.46 In response to the municipal court's argument 
that its action did not implicate any of Ms. Bobb's fundamental 
rights,47 Justice Miller correctly pointed out that California in-
vokes strict scrutiny when either a suspect classification or a 
fundamental right is at issue.48 
Respondent argued in addition that since Ms. Bobb was not 
denied any right to which she was legally or constitutionally en-
titled, strict scrutiny should not apply.4& Justice Miller replied 
that "no right other than the right to equal protection need be 
asserted" to invoke application of the strict scrutiny standard.1IO 
Once it is determined that the strict scrutiny standard ap-
plies, the state must demonstrate that it has. a compelling inter-
est which justifies the classification, and that the classification is 
necessary to further that compelling interest. III The municipal 
court failed to articulate any compelling reasons for asking par-
ticular questions of female venire members only. As a result, 
Justice Miller concluded that the trial judge's manner of ques-
tioning the venire violated the California constitution. Thus, Ms. 
Bobb's conduct, like Ms. Hamilton's, in refusing to answer the 
particular questions was justified.1I2 
C. PRESIDING JUSTICE KLINE'S CONCURRENCE 
In concurring with the decision to reverse the contempt 
judgment, Justice Kline stated that Justice Miller "reached the 
right result for the wrong reason."113 He noted that "the most 
significant issue raised by this case relates more to the proper 
45. [d. at 864, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 271. 
46. [d. at 864-65, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 272. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying 
text. 
47. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 273. 
48. [d. 
49. [d. 
50. [d. at 867, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 273. 
51. [d. at 865, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 272. 
52. [d. at 867, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 273-74. 
53. [d. 
9
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treatment of jurors than the rights of women."54 Justice Kline 
next cited California case law providing that unless a case can-
not be decided without reaching a constitutional issue, that issue 
should not be addressed. 55 In his estimation, the unique facts of 
this case required reversal of the contempt judgment regardless 
of the constitutionality of the voir dire and thus, he did not ad-
dress Ms. Bobb's constitutional challenge. 56 
Justice Kline indicated that summary contempt power must 
be "employed with great prudence and caution, lest it be im-
properly used to stifle freedom of thought and speech."57 He 
found this to be particularly important when the contemner is a 
prospective juror, since jurors are crucial to our system of jus-
tice.58 He also observed that jury service is a valuable experience 
for the jurors and 59 he feared that trials by capable juries might 
be jeopardized if prospective jurors were rebuked for "dar[ing] 
to speak and act upon their personal truth."60 
Justice Kline concluded that because the impropriety of Ms. 
Bobb's conduct was doubtful, the contempt in this case was sub-
ject to a higher standard of review than is normally invoked.61 
That is, specific wrongful intent is not ordinarily an essential el-
54.Id. 
55. Palermo v. Stocton Theatres, 32 Cal. 2d 53, 65, 195 P.2d 1 (1948), quoting Estate 
of Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 534, 73 P. 424; see also, People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 3d 663, 667, 
128 Cal. Rptr. 888, 547 P.2d 1000. For a brief discussion of this same judicial reluctance 
to reach constitutional issues unless necessary in federal courts, see, Panel Discussion, 
Judicial Review and Constitutional Limitations, 14 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 645 (1984) 
(Comments by Judge Patricia Wald, Judicial Review - The Quest for Legitimacy and 
Certainty (Notes from the Trenches) at 647). 
56. Bobb, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 868, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 274. 
57. Id. Petitioner did not advance a first amendment freedom of speech challenge to 
the contempt judgment. In In Re Shuler, 210 Cal. 377, 292 P. 481 (1930), the California 
Supreme Court stated that the "constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech ... do 
. not . . . go so far as to protect the citizen in making such comments . . . that have for 
their purpose and manifest tendency an attempted interference with the orderly admin-
istration of justice .... " [d. at 402, 292 P. at 492. 
58. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 868-69, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 275. 
59. Jury service "should be regarded as a free school which is always open and in 
which each juror learns [his/her I rights . . . and is given practical lessons in the law 
.... " 143 Cal. App. 3d at 868, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 274 (quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOC-
RACY IN AMERICA 274 (1969). 
60. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 869, 129.Cal. Rptr. at 275. 
61. Id. 
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ement of a contempt proceeding.62 When the conduct in ques-
tion is only of doubtful impropriety, however, then absent spe-
cific wrongful intent, the conduct is not viewed as contempt.63 
Justice Kline therefore indicated that unless Ms. Bobb pos-
sessed the specific wrongful intent to impeach or embarrass the 
court or to interrupt its proceedings, the contempt judgment 
could not be upheld.64 Further, if the contempt judgment was 
based on an interruption of the court's proceedings, it could not 
be upheld unless it amounted to "disorderly, contemptuous, or 
insolent behavior toward the judge while holding court .... "65 
In reviewing the contempt order, Justice Kline noted that even 
the trial court admitted that Ms. Bobb expressed her views "on 
the basis of an articulated principle and did so respectfully and 
in good faith",66 and that any interruption in court proceedings 
could not have lasted longer than a minute and a half. He con-
cluded that the record did not warrant upholding the contempt 
judgment.67 
Justice Kline stated that the "use of this drastic remedy in 
the unique circumstances of the present case was in part unwar-
ranted because other alternatives were available."68 These in-
cluded: (1) the trial judge could have excused Ms. Bobb from 
jury service in the case; (2) the trial court could have passed the 
challenged question and left it to further pursuit by counsel; or 
(3) the trial court could have put the challenged questions to the 
male members of the venire.69 None of these alternatives satis-
factorily disposes of the case. 
First, Justice Kline suggested that Ms. Bobb could have 
been excused from jury service. Although this would have pre-
vented the contempt judgment, it would not have remedied the 
equal protection violation which occurred when the trial judge 
posed one set of questions solely to the female members of the 
62. Id. at 869, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 275 citing In re Jasper, 30 Cal. App. 3d 985, 106 Cal. 
Rptr. 754 (1973). 
63.Id. 
64. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 870, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 276. 
65. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 870, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 276 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 
1209 (West 1982)). 
66. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 872, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 277. 
67. Id. at 875, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 279. 
68. Id. at 874, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 278. 
69. Id. at 874, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 278-79. 
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venire. Also, dismissing from jury service all those who refuse to 
answer unconstitutional questions may impair a criminal defen-
dant's right to a trial by a jury comprised of a cross-section of 
the community.70 
Justice Kline's second suggestion, that the trial judge leave 
the challenged questions to further pursuit by counsel,71 is also 
unsatisfactory. The voir dire was conducted in an improper, un-
constitutional manner, regardless of how the attorneys would 
subsequently have conducted their own voir dire.72 
Finally, Justice Kline suggested that the trial judge could 
have posed the questions to the prospective male jurors as well, 
which is what Ms. Bobb requested.73 Had the trial court done 
this, no constitutional violation would have occurred and Ms. 
Bobb would have answered the questions posed to her. Justice 
Kline's suggestion that the trial judge could have chosen this 
course hardly remedies the constitutional violation that arose 
when the trial judge refused to do so. 
D. THE DISSENT 
JustiCe Rouse writing in dissent would have upheld the con-
tempt judgment.74 He found that Ms. Bobb's refusal to answer 
the voir dire questions disrupted the court's business, and that 
the refusal was not a result of misunderstanding but rather a 
deliberate act on Ms. Bobb's part.71~ Justice Kline's three alter-
natives, according to Justice Rouse, were of little merit since 
none of them adequately responded to the defiance Ms. Bobb 
70. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1974) (which established a criminal de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury composed of a cross section of the 
community). See also, People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 
890 (1978) (also recognizing the defendant's right to a jury drawn from a representative 
cross section of community). 
71. Bobb, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 874, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 279. 
72. Appellant's Opening Brief at 13, Bobb v. Municipal Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 874, 
192 Cal. Rptr. 270 (First District 1983) [hereinafter cited as Brief]. 
73. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 874, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 278. 
74. Id. at 875, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 280. 
75. Id. at 877, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 281. 
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exhibited.76 
Justice Rouse also found that Ms. Bobb's refusal to answer 
the challenged questions did not rise to "a matter of constitu-
tional dimension .... "77 He ob!,erved that "the matter of one's 
marital status and occupation is a common subject of inquiry 
and discussion at any gathering of two or more persons .... "78 
The content of the questions, however, is not what Ms. Bobb 
objected to; instead, she challenged the discriminatory manner 
in which they were posed.79 Thus, the dissent also failed to ad-
dress the central issue-the violation of Ms. Bobb's equal pro-
tection guarantee. 
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE MILLER'S OPINION 
Bobb is a case of first impression in California. Although 
Justice Miller's opinion is not binding on lower courts,80 it is 
nonetheless important. 
The opinion affirmed an individual's right to confront viola-
tions of equal protection and thereby implicitly rejected the 
"non-confrontational alternatives" the superior court, in af-
firming the contempt judgment, suggested were available to Ms. 
Bobb.61 The suggestions that Ms. Bobb write a letter to the trial 
76. [d. at 876-77, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 280-81. 
77. [d. at 875, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 280. 
78. [d. 
79. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Yick Wo dealt with the ad-
ministration of a city ordinance which required those wishing to operate a laundry to 
obtain the consent of the board of supervisors. Although with regard to national origin, 
the statute was neutral on its face, it was administered in a discriminatory manner. The 
required consent of the board was often denied to Chinese laundry operators. After such 
a denial, Yick Wo was convicted for continuing to operate his laundry without the 
board's consent. In overturning the conviction, the United States Supreme Court stated 
that "[tlhough the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is 
applied and administered by public authority with ... an unequal hand, so as practi-
cally to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances 
... the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution." 
80. See Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936). In discussing 
the precedential value of a case in which there was no majority opinion, the court stated 
that the "two associates of the writer of the opinion concurred only in the judgment 
.... It is apparent, therefore, that this reason became thereby only the personal opin-
ion of the justice who wrote the opinion. Such conclusion cannot, therefore, have any 
controlling weight here." [d. at 679, 59 P.2d at 146. 
81. Brief, supra note 72, at 18. 
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judge stating her objection to the voir dire82 or make a short 
non-confrontational statement in a respectful manner after 
trial,83 were clearly unsatisfactory since neither would have rem-
edied the wrong already inflicted upon Ms. Bobb, nor would 
they in any way guarantee that the trial judge would alter his 
voir dire questioning in the future. 
The superior court also noted that since Ms. Bobb was an 
attorney, she could have used her privilege of informal access to 
the judge and arrange a private discussion with him.8' The right 
to challenge a violation of one's constitutional rights should not 
be contingent upon one's status as an attorney. In addition, the 
same "too little, too late" problem remains. 
The opinion should also help to diminish the effects tradi-
tional sex stereotypes have had on the jury selection and voir 
dire processes by sending a signal, albeit from a split court, to 
trial judges that voir dire should be conducted in a manner con-
sistent with the equal protection provisions of the California 
Constitution. 
v. CONCLUSION 
While the result in Bobb is clearly correct under either Jus-
tice Miller's or Justice Kline's analysis, to the extent that it is a 
split decision, it is unsatisfactory. Justice Kline's approach is 
technically correct since California courts do not reach constitu-
tional issues unless a case cannot be decided without doing so. 
However, precisely because Justice Miller upheld Ms. Bobb's 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection, his approach is 
philosophically better than Justice Kline's. Inasmuch as the dis-
sent failed to provide either a correct technical or philosophical 
resolution of the dispute, it is of little importance. 
Since there is no majority opinion in Bobb, Justice Miller's 
analysis is not of compelling precedential value. It should, how-
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 19. 
84. Id. at 20. 
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ever, serve as a reminder to trial courts that all citizens, in their 
capacity as jurors and otherwise, are entitled to the equal pro-
tection of the laws guaranteed by the California Constitution. 
Justice Miller's opinion, if implemented, will diminish the nega-
tive effect of traditional gender-based stereotypes on the right of 
women to fully and equally participate in the jury system. 
Randy Riddle* 
• Student, Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1985. 
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